August 24, 2021

Via E-Mail (www.regulations.gov)

Regulations Division
Office of General Counsel
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
451 Seventh Street, S.W., Room 10276
Washington, DC  20410

RE: Reinstatement of HUD’s Discriminatory Effects Standard
[Docket No. FR-6251-P-01] RIN 2529-AB02

Dear Sir or Madam:

On behalf of our clients, the National Leased Housing Association (“NLHA”), the Council for Affordable and Rural Housing (“CARH”), the National Apartment Association (“NAA”), National Affordable Housing Management Association (“NAHMA”), and the National Multifamily Housing Council (“NMHC”) (jointly, the “Housing Associations”), and their tens of thousands of members – owners, managers, developers, and investors in the nation’s multifamily housing industry – we provide these comments to the Proposed Rule in “Reinstatement of HUD’s Discriminatory Effects Standard,” [Docket No. FR-6251-P-01], RIN 2529-AB02, published at 86 Fed. Reg. 33590 (June 25, 2021) (the “2021 Proposal”).

The nation’s housing providers represented here support the goals of the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) and are fully committed to creating communities that provide equal housing opportunity for all. However, continued uncertainty and confusion related to disparate effects, or disparate impact, liability under the FHA has resulted in operational, legal and broad business challenges for the housing industry. Unfortunately, the Proposal will do little to address the needs of housing providers and America’s renters or improve the predictability and results of fair housing efforts. Most importantly, the 2021 Proposal fails to seize the opportunity to clarify lingering questions about how guidance from the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Texas Dept. of Hous. & Comm. Affairs v. The Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. (“Inclusive Communities”), 576 U.S. 519 (2015) should be incorporated into the rule. Because it fails to address these important legal developments since the issuance of its original disparate impact rule in 2013, the 2021 Proposal renders the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (“HUD”) disparate impact policies largely irrelevant and will lead courts and litigants to develop a separate body of case law that follows the requirements of the Inclusive Communities decision. Instead of simply reinstating the 2013 rule, the Housing Associations therefore urge HUD to resolve this tension by revising and
reissuing a rule and supporting guidance that helps housing providers execute necessary and ordinary business practices without running afoul of fair housing requirements.

**Background**

As noted above, the theory of disparate impact liability under the FHA has been in flux for the last ten years. After proposing to adopt disparate impact rules in 2011, HUD issued its final disparate impact rules in 2013. 24 CFR §100.500 (the “2013 Rule”), published at 78 Fed. Reg. 11460. Thereafter, some courts began to adopt those regulations as governing their adjudication of disparate impact cases under the FHA. See *The Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Texas Dept. of Hous. & Comm. Affairs*, 747 F.3d. 275, 276-77(2014).

Shortly after HUD published its final disparate impact rule, the U.S. Supreme Court accepted a certiorari petition in the *Inclusive Communities* case, where the plaintiff contended that application of facially neutral principles for allocating low income housing tax credits in Texas nevertheless had a disparate impact on housing opportunities for minorities and persons in other protected classes. In the court’s 2015 decision, authored by Justice Kennedy, the Court affirmed that disparate impact liability did in fact exist under the FHA. However, Justice Kennedy focused much of his decision on what he referred to as “safeguards” that were needed to prevent “abusive” disparate impact cases. 576 U.S. at 544. He pointed to constitutional objections that might arise if disparate impact relied solely on showing statistical imbalances. Id. at 540. He also warned against practical consequences, such as placing government and private interests in a “double-bind” (id. at 542), where any decision they make could be attacked as discriminatory, or where other “valid interests” might be frustrated, if appropriate safeguards were not put in place. Id. at 541. These safeguards include, among other things, a “robust causality requirement,” demonstrating that the “defendant’s policy or policies caus[ed] that disparity.” Id. at 542. He also insisted that, to avoid “displac[ing] valid governmental and private priorities,” disparate impact cases should focus “solely [on] ‘removing . . . artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers.”’ Id. at 544, quoting *Griggs v. Duke Power Co.*, 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).

The Supreme Court’s decision in *Inclusive Communities* fundamentally altered the analysis of disparate impact cases. As a result, it also rendered HUD’s 2013 Rule obsolete because the 2013 Rule did not address the safeguards identified by the Supreme Court. Indeed, while the Supreme Court cited to the 2013 Rule (id. at 527), it did not formally endorse it.

Although initially HUD took the position that its 2013 Rule was completely consistent with the *Inclusive Communities* decision, HUD eventually changed its position. In 2019, HUD proposed a new set of disparate impact regulations which attempted to update the 2013 Rule to reflect the changes introduced by the *Inclusive Communities* decision. 84 Fed. Reg. 42854 (the “2019 Proposal”). Among other things, the 2019 Proposal expressly identified the safeguards discussed in the *Inclusive Communities* decision, and revised the parties’ respective burdens of proof to correspond with that decision’s requirements. Parties participating in these comments also filed comments with respect to the 2019 Proposal. See Letter to Office of the General Counsel from Harry J. Kelly (“Comment Letter”) dated October 17, 2019 (Attachment A
hereto). At that time, the Housing Associations acknowledged the need to address the inconsistencies between HUD’s rule and subsequent legal outcomes and were generally supportive of the 2019 Proposal. However, the Comment Letter identified additional elements that needed to be incorporated into the 2019 Proposal to more fully adhere to the *Inclusive Communities* guidance and improve compliance efforts.


Among other things, the district court pointed out that the 2020 Rule incorporated a number of new terms and procedural requirements that were not found in the *Inclusive Communities* guidance and that would only make disparate impact analysis more difficult in the future. Id. at *9-19. It found that “these changes constitute a massive overhaul of HUD’s disparate impact standards, to the benefit of putative defendants and to the detriment of putative plaintiffs.” Id. at 10. As a result, the court entered its order enjoining implementation and enforcement of the 2020 Rule.

While questions remain about whether the 2019 Proposal and the 2020 Rule fairly addressed the concepts adopted in the *Inclusive Communities* decision, they rightly acknowledged that the 2013 Rule was no longer viable and needed to be updated to reflect the consequences of that decision. The 2021 Proposal, on the other hand, would essentially reinstate the 2013 Rule without any significant changes to reflect *Inclusive Communities* and decisions since that time. As explained in the following section of these comments, it is inadequate to reimpose the 2013 Rule without making necessary changes reflecting those changes wrought by *Inclusive Communities*. Courts, housing providers and the public need a national disparate impact regulation that provides uniformity and equal treatment of all persons involved in disparate impact proceedings. Without proper review and revision of HUD’s policy, courts and litigants will continue to develop disparate impact law outside of the HUD regulatory framework, creating challenges for timely and consistent fulfillment of fair housing requirements.

**Discussion**

1. **The 2013 Rule is the wrong starting point for HUD’s efforts as it does not provide a framework to address the safeguards imposed by the *Inclusive Communities* decision.**

As explained below, courts and litigants have struggled to implement the *Inclusive Communities* decision. To reduce this confusion, HUD must take the lead in making changes to the 2013 Rule that incorporate the safeguards announced there. This can be done through modest changes to the 2013 Rule that do not unfairly tip the scales towards either party. To be sure, Justice Kennedy vindicated the concept of disparate impact in FHAct cases and felt that it
served an important role in permitting “plaintiffs to counteract unconscious prejudices and disguised animus that escape easy classification as disparate treatment.” 576 U.S. at 540. But he was also unmistakably concerned about “abusive” disparate impact cases that would frustrate the “valid interests” of public agencies and private entities. Necessarily, *Inclusive Communities* will limit the claims of some plaintiffs, but if HUD takes the lead in implementing the safeguards, only “abusive” claims will be restricted.

Unfortunately, Justice Kennedy’s opinion did not offer a framework that would allow courts and litigants to systematically address these issues. Our review of a number of cases suggests that in the absence of such a framework, courts and litigants have struggled to address the concepts *Inclusive Communities* requires. In the process, courts have increasingly turned away from HUD’s disparate impact regulations, apparently because it offers them no way to address the safeguards that *Inclusive Communities* now requires them to consider. The following discussion summarizes the results of our analysis:

a. **Courts are struggling with applying the *Inclusive Communities* standards into the framework of HUD’s 2013 DI rules.** The *Inclusive Communities* decision clearly identified a number of safeguards to prevent abusive disparate impact cases, but it did not provide detailed explanations of those safeguards or provide a framework for how those safeguards should be applied by the courts. Since the *Inclusive Communities* decision, courts have been trying to develop a method of applying the safeguards in a way that would allow appropriate cases to proceed while sifting out “abusive” cases. As a result, *Inclusive Communities* left it for the courts to flesh out and give meaning to the safeguards it adopted. The process has not been easy or simple.

For example, in *Woda Cooper Dev., Inc. v. City of Warner Robins*, the Middle District of Georgia summarized the struggle that courts have experienced in analyzing a plaintiff’s disparate impact claim under the FHA. In response to the defendants’ questioning of the merits of plaintiff’s disparate impact claim, the court expressed, “To a point, that is understandable—since the Supreme Court's decision in [*Inclusive Communities*], courts have struggled to determine just what it takes to allege a disparate impact theory of liability.” *Woda Cooper Dev., Inc. v. City of Warner Robins*, Civil Action No. 5:20-CV-159 (MTT), 2021 WL 1093630, *1, at *7 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 22, 2021). But, while acknowledging that a robust causal connection is one of the safeguards identified in *Inclusive Communities*, the district court continued, “Just what ‘robust causality’ means is very much a work in progress.” Id. (citing *Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co.*, 920 F.3d 890, 903-09 (5th Cir. 2019) (reviewing the efforts to define “robust causality”); see also *Inclusive Cmtyts. Project, Inc., v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs*, Civil Action No. 3:08-CV-0546-D, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114562, *1 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2016) (“other circuits ‘have applied multiple different legal standards to similar [disparate impact] claims under the FHA’”). Simply put, the safeguards identified by the Supreme Court are not self-executing and require further elaboration, both with respect to what they require and how they should be implemented as courts consider disparate impact claims. That means that HUD should use the current rulemaking process to not merely reinstate its 2013 Rule, but to provide guidance to courts, administrative law judges, housing
providers and renters about how the *Inclusive Communities* safeguards apply to disparate impact cases.

b. **Courts have alternated between following the HUD regulations and applying the ICP safeguards.** In some cases, the courts struggled with a basic issue of whether to apply HUD’s disparate impact rule at all. Thus, the courts acknowledge the existence of the HUD regulations but in many cases, courts seem to treat the *Inclusive Communities* safeguards as an alternative standard for determining disparate impact liability. See, e.g., *Reyes v. Waples Mobile Home Park Ltd. P’ship*, 903 F.3d 415, 424 n.4 (4th Cir. 2018) (“the standard announced in [*Inclusive Communities*]… controls our inquiry”); *City of Los Angeles v. Wells Fargo & Co.*, Case No. 2:13-cv-09007-ODW(RZx), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93451, *1 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2015) (basing its decision on how *Inclusive Communities* has instructed lower courts); *Ellis v. City of Minneapolis*, 860 F.3d 1106 (8th Cir. 2017) (exclusively applying the *Inclusive Communities* safeguards to determine whether the Plaintiffs pled a prima facie case of disparate impact under the FHAct). No doubt, the courts’ decision to ignore the 2013 Rule reflects the fact that since the 2013 Rule does not explicitly incorporate the *Inclusive Communities* safeguards, the 2013 Rule is largely irrelevant to determining how to decide a disparate impact case at this point. See, *Lincoln Prop. Co.*, 920 F.3d at 902 (“Although it affirmed our decision, the Supreme Court never explicitly stated that it adopted the HUD regulation’s framework”). If a court has to choose between following HUD regulations or the Supreme Court, they will follow the Supreme Court. This suggests that if HUD wants its regulations to be something more than window-dressing, it needs to modify the regulations to affirmatively address the safeguards announced in the *Inclusive Communities* decision.

c. **Courts need additional guidance about how and when to apply the Inclusive Communities safeguards.** Federal procedural rules allow parties to file a motion to dismiss which challenges the sufficiency of a complaint by arguing that even if all the facts in the complaint are true, they fail to state a legal claim. In that situation, it seems at least some of the safeguards – most often, the “robust causation” requirement – may properly be the basis of a motion to dismiss at an early phase of the case. Indeed, in explaining that “[a] plaintiff who fails to allege facts at the pleading stage . . . demonstrating a causal connection cannot make out a prima facie case of disparate impact,” Justice Kennedy seemed to invite early scrutiny of plaintiff’s theory of causation, as some courts have acknowledged. *Ellis*, 860 F.3d at 1112 (adopting Justice Kennedy’s “causal connection” requirement); see also *Winfield v. City of New York*, 15CV5236-LTS-DFC, 2016 WL 6208564, *1, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2016) (citing Justice Kennedy’s “causal connection” guidance). But even here, courts appear to be struggling with whether they are to subject disparate impact plaintiffs’ causation theories to early scrutiny or to treat those theories like any other portion of the plaintiffs’ burden of proof. See id. (noting that *Inclusive Communities* “did not alter the plausibility standard for pleading, which requires only the plaintiff plead allegations that plausibly give rise to an inference that the challenged policy causes a disparate impact”) (citing *Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist.*, 801 F.3d 72, 87 (2d Cir. 2015)). Rather, they are asking whether the plaintiff’s pleadings – including its theory of causation – if taken as true, are sufficient to make out a prima facie case, as in any other motion to dismiss. This suggests that HUD’s basic burden-shifting framework –
where the burden is initially on the plaintiff to make out a prima facie case – is still valid, but that courts need additional guidance about how to address the plaintiff’s burden at the motion to dismiss phase, especially with respect to the Inclusive Communities safeguards.

2. **To avoid obsolescence and to promote the goals of uniformity in resolving disparate impact cases, HUD must update its 2013 Rule to reflect the Inclusive Communities holding.**

The discussion of case law above indicates that HUD’s current disparate impact rule is legally obsolete and will become increasingly irrelevant unless HUD updates it to reflect the outcome of the Inclusive Communities decision. Because it fails to address the concerns raised in the Inclusive Communities decision, it does not provide a useful framework to resolve disparate impact cases. Reinstating an obsolete rule will do nothing to promote HUD’s goal of achieving a uniform mechanism to resolve disparate impact disputes. Rather, it will continue to encourage courts and litigants to develop alternative approaches to handling disparate impact cases outside the framework originally established by HUD.

In order to properly update its disparate impact rule, HUD should clarify what each party must show to meet its burden. Fortunately, much can be accomplished with minimal edits, but those edits are necessary to address the Supreme Court’s guidance, including the following changes:

a. **HUD must revise the plaintiff/complainant’s burden of proof to expressly include satisfaction of the safeguards announced in Inclusive Communities.** HUD must acknowledge that while Inclusive Communities confirmed that disparate impact liability exists under the FHAct, it also recognized that “abusive” disparate impact cases could frustrate legitimate goals of public and private decision makers. Unavoidably, these will add to the pleading burdens on plaintiffs, but that is exactly what the Supreme Court intended when it imposed additional requirements on plaintiffs to prevent those abusive lawsuits.

First, HUD’s disparate impact rules should expressly adopt the “robust causality requirement,” which requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that the disparate impact suffered was caused by the policy it challenges, as part of the plaintiff’s burden of proof. The current rule does mention causation in the most general way:

> The charging party . . . or the plaintiff . . . has the burden of proving that a challenged practice caused or predictably will cause a discriminatory impact.

24 CFR §100.500(c)(1)(2019). Justice Kennedy made clear that to satisfy his “robust causality requirement,” something more than a vague causal relationship is needed. The current HUD standard would presumably be satisfied even if multiple policies or practices caused the alleged discriminatory impact, so long as the challenged policy or practice was one of those causes. That is not consistent with Justice Kennedy’s “robust causality requirement,” which is not met where multiple factors could have caused a particular harm and is inconsistent with his warning that defendants should not be “held liable for racial disparities they did not create.” 576 U.S. at 542. Justice Kennedy was...
imposing a “sole cause” standard which should be reflected in HUD’s regulations. See, e.g., 576 U.S. at 543 (warning that “[i]t may also be difficult to establish causation because of the multiple factors that go into investment decisions about where to construct or renovate housing units.”) The current rule does not reflect the “sole cause” nature of Justice Kennedy’s “robust causality” requirement and must be amended to do so.

Likewise, on multiple occasions, Justice Kennedy confirmed that to prevail, a disparate impact plaintiff must show that the challenged policy or practice constitutes “an artificial, arbitrary and unnecessary barrier[]” to housing opportunities for persons in a protected class. 576 U.S. at 540, 544. Clearly, this was not dicta – the “artificial, arbitrary and unnecessary” standard was a critical mechanism for sorting abusive disparate impact cases from legitimate ones. Indeed, he explained that “the [FHAct] aims to ensure that [the] priorities [of housing providers] can be achieved without arbitrarily creating discriminatory effects or perpetuating segregation.” Id. at 540 (emphasis added). And in his conclusion, he warned that without the safeguards he recommended, “disparate impact liability might displace valid governmental and private priorities, rather than solely [remov[ing]] . . . artificial, arbitrary and unnecessary barriers.” Id. at 544 (emphasis added), quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. Clearly, Justice Kennedy felt that courts had to focus “solely” on attacking artificial, arbitrary and unnecessary barriers, to prevent intrusion into otherwise legitimate public and private decision-making.

To incorporate these concepts, HUD should make modest revisions to its description of the plaintiff’s burden to read as follows:

b. **The burden on the defendant/respondent should be revised to reflect the lower “valid interest” safeguard stated in Inclusive Communities.** In its current regulation, HUD has adopted a strict burden of proof for a defendant or respondent. They must demonstrate that “the challenged practice is necessary to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interest of the respondent or defendant.” 24 CFR §100.500(c)(2). This is part of the larger “legally sufficient justification” standard applicable in HUD’s disparate impact regulations. Id., §100.500(b). That multi-part burden imposes a stringent obligation on parties defending disparate impact claims and is inconsistent with the lower standard stated in Inclusive Communities. There, Justice Kennedy stated that to meet its burden, a defendant only had to “state and explain the valid interest served by its policies.” 576 U.S. at 541 (emphasis added). He explained that this “step of the analysis is analogous to the business necessity standard under Title VII and provides a defense against disparate-impact liability.” Id. He further explained that, while there were differences between fair housing and fair employment requirements, “housing authorities and private developers [should] be allowed to maintain a policy if it is necessary to achieve a valid interest.” Id. Kennedy acknowledged HUD’s “substantial,
legitimate, nondiscriminatory interest” provisions in the Inclusive Communities decision, but did not expressly adopt that standard, opting instead for the “valid interest” test, which focuses on business necessity only. To the extent that the “valid interest” test sets a lower standard for defendants’ burden of proof, it should replace the more stringent “substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interest” test in the 2013 Rule.

Both the “legally sufficient justification” provision and the “substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interest” provision impose burdens on defendants and respondents that exceed the “valid interest” test set out in Inclusive Communities. For that reason, the “legally sufficient justification” provision in §100.500(b) should be deleted, and the description of the defendant’s burden in §100.500(c)(2) should be revised as follows:

(2) Once the charging party or plaintiff satisfied the burden of proof set forth in Paragraph (c)(1) of this section, the respondent or defendant has the burden of proving that the challenged practice is necessary to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory valid interests of the respondent or defendant.

c. HUD should clarify the circumstances in which it is appropriate to seek dismissal of disparate impact claims. In Inclusive Communities, Justice Kennedy observed that “prompt resolution [of disparate impact] cases is important,” and suggested that “[a] plaintiff who fails to allege facts at the pleading stage . . . demonstrating a causal connection cannot make out a prima facie case of disparate impact.” 576 U.S. at 543. As noted above, some courts (and HUD itself, in its 2020 Rule) suggested that this language imposes an additional burden on plaintiffs in particular to demonstrate at an early point the “robust causality requirement” that the Supreme Court called for. Other courts, on the other hand, state that while Inclusive Communities may have imposed stricter causation requirements on disparate impact plaintiffs, it did not alter the timing or methods courts have used to assess the sufficiency of a plaintiffs’ claims. To eliminate misunderstanding, HUD should confirm how and when courts should assess the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s allegations in disparate impact cases – including allegations concerning causation – and to make clear that disparate impact claims may be dismissed at the pleading stage if the plaintiff fails to allege any fact essential to meeting its burden of proof.

d. HUD should revisit the 2019 Proposal to determine whether other modifications proposed there are appropriate to meet the requirements of Inclusive Communities. As noted above, the Comment Letter supported the 2019 Proposal’s attempt to develop a full response to the guidance provided by Inclusive Communities. For example, the 2019 Proposal lists a number of defenses available to defendants and modifies the burden on the plaintiffs, in the final stage of HUD’s three-part burden-shifting analysis, to respond by demonstrating that there is an alternative to the challenged policy or practice that serves the defendant’s interest in “an equally effective manner without imposing materially greater costs on, or creating material burdens for, the defendant.” See 84 Fed. Reg. at 42863. Although not discussed substantively in Inclusive Communities, what the plaintiff must show in the final burden-shifting phase remains an issue: Must the plaintiff demonstrate merely that a less discriminatory alternative
exists, or must that alternative be at least as effective and no more expensive or burdensome than the defendant’s original solution, as the 2019 Proposal suggested?

Many of the issues and changes addressed in the 2019 Proposal are consistent with the goals expressed in *Inclusive Communities* to avoid improper intrusions into policy choices by public and private decision-makers. We urge HUD to review the 2019 Proposal again to fully determine what other changes are needed to update HUD’s disparate impact regulations to appropriately reflect the outcome of the *Inclusive Communities* decision. We also encourage HUD to review the attached Comment Letter, which reflects additional suggestions for modifying its 2013 Rule. Those suggestions are pertinent to improving HUD’s disparate impact regulations in general and in particular adhering more closely to the guidance provided by *Inclusive Communities*.

**Conclusion**

After many years of stability, fair housing laws have been increasingly volatile, especially including disparate impact liability. Therefore, HUD should focus its efforts on achieving a long-term and predictable fair housing requirements, and should begin that task by revising its 2013 Rule to reflect what the Supreme Court has said in *Inclusive Communities* and what federal courts have said since. Modest changes, such as those suggested here, will do much to reinvigorate HUD’s disparate impact regulation and make it a tool that agency officials, courts and litigants can use to properly deliver the goals of the FHAct in the future.

We appreciate the opportunity to present these comments to you. If you have any questions or would like additional information on any topic addressed here, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Very truly yours,

Harry J. Kelly
Partner

HJK
VIA E-MAIL (http://www.regulations.gov)

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Re: Comments on HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard – Proposed Rule
Docket No. FR-6111-P-02
RIN 2529-AA98

Dear Sir or Madam:

On behalf of our clients, the National Leased Housing Association (“NLHA”), the Council for Affordable and Rural Housing (“CARH”), the National Apartment Association (“NAA”), and the National Multifamily Housing Council (“NMHC”) (jointly, the “Housing Associations”), and their thousands of members – owners, managers, developers, and investors in the nation’s multifamily housing industry – we provide this response to the Proposed Rule (the “Proposed Rule”) in “HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard,” Docket No. FR-6111-P-02, published at 84 Fed. Reg. 42854 (the “Proposal”).

The Housing Associations strongly commend the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) for its effort to revise its existing rule for disparate impact claims under the Fair Housing Act (the “Act”). 24 CFR § 100.500 (the “Current Rule”), to update it and incorporate important guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Tex. Dept. of Hous. & Comm. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmty. Project, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015). The Proposed Rule will correct a number of errors and deficiencies in the Current Rule, helping to prevent “abusive” disparate impact cases while preserving the “heartland” of disparate impact liability to combat “arbitrary, artificial and unnecessary burdens” on housing opportunities. 135 S. Ct. at 2522. The changes will also promote the important goals of uniformity and predictability in disparate impact

Outcomes. Although these comments strongly endorse the Proposed Rule, they also recommend some clarifications and additions to the Proposed Rule, to make it more effective and reduce unnecessary litigation, and respond to a series of questions raised by HUD in the Proposal, as explained in more detail below.

1. **Background**

In their 2018 Comments, the Housing Associations recognized that disparate impact can serve an important purpose in the “heartland” of cases it was meant to address—such as exclusionary zoning practices—but that the Current Rule needed extensive revision. They pointed out, among other things, that the Current Rule did not reflect many of the “safeguards” announced in the Supreme Court’s *Inclusive Communities* decision. As a result, the Current Rule could lead to exactly the sort of “abusive” disparate impact claims that the Supreme Court warned against.

To correct the errors and deficiencies in the Current Rule, the 2018 Comments proposed a “Framework” for a revised disparate impact rule, that set out the elements of a disparate impact claim and made clear that at all times, the party asserting disparate impact claims had the burden to prove those claims. Among other things, the 2018 Comments also urged HUD to adopt safe harbors that would permit housing providers to adopt essential tenant selection and property management policies without fear of subsequent litigation and to identify specific defenses to disparate impact claims.

II. **Comments on Proposed Rule**

A. The Housing Associations Congratulate HUD On The Improvements Reflected in the Proposed Rule.

By adopting many of the components of the Framework proposed in the 2018 Comments, HUD’s Proposed Rule marks a dramatic improvement over the Current Rule. Among other things, the Proposed Rule identifies a series of elements to a disparate impact claim under the Act that a disparate impact claimant must prove. This includes showing facts that the challenged practice is “arbitrary, artificial and unnecessary” to achieve a valid business or policy goal and establishing that a “robust causal link” exists between the challenged policy and the alleged discriminatory effect, and that the “alleged disparity caused by the policy or practice is significant,” among other elements. See Proposed Rule, § 100.500(a). The elements derive directly from the “safeguards” enunciated in the *Inclusive Communities* decision.

By adopting these changes, HUD will discourage the sort of “abusive” disparate impact cases that the Supreme Court warned against, including actions that do nothing more than “second-guess” otherwise legitimate decisions by government agencies and private entities. 135 S. Ct. at

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2 As explained below, some of the elements announced in the Proposed Rule should be clarified to avoid additional litigation that would jeopardize the gains in efficiency and predictability promoted by the Proposed Rule. As explained in Section C below, the Housing Associations recommend that HUD provide additional clarification for these elements and other components in the Proposed Rule.
2522, 2524. As the Supreme Court recognized, housing providers make critical decisions every day about property operations and management. In adopting the “safeguards” discussed in Inclusive Communities, the Supreme Court struck a balance between the legitimate needs of housing providers to manage their properties safely and successfully and the rights of persons in protected classes to challenge “arbitrary, artificial and unnecessary” practices that have a discriminatory effect.

The changes made by the Proposed Rule will help to implement the balance struck in Inclusive Communities. For example, it will reduce that fear that housing providers may face liability for applying neutral screening procedures before admitting new tenants. A residential lease is essentially a long term license to occupy a dwelling in exchange for compliance with the lease provisions, including timely payment of rent and respect for the right of peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other tenants. A housing provider must, therefore, adopt policies on matters such as a prospective tenant’s credit and criminal history in order to determine whether the prospective tenant poses reasonable risks. No housing provider wants to deal with eviction proceedings if they can be avoided by applying neutral credit screening procedures in advance, and no housing provider wants to rent a unit to a person whose criminal background raises a bona fide concern about the safety and security of people and property at the premises.

An example of the burdens that HUD’s Current Rule imposes on legitimate property management issues is the guidance (the “OGC Guidance”) issued by HUD’s Office of General Counsel (“OGC”) in April 2016. Invoking the Current Rule, OGC warned that adopting crime screening policies could lead to disparate impact claims to the extent they tended to disqualify a disproportionate number of persons in protected classes. See OGC Guidance at https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/HUD_OGCGUIDAPPPFHASTANDCR.PDF. Among other things, the OGC Guidance suggested that in order to utilize crime screening data, it was necessary to perform an “individualized assessment of relevant mitigating information” to determine whether to admit a renter with an adverse criminal history. OGC Guidance at 7. According to OGC, this would require housing providers to assess other factors, such as the facts surrounding the criminal conduct, the age of the renter when the criminal conduct occurred, and evidence of rehabilitation activities, before making a screening decision. The requirement to perform an individualized assessment of mitigating factors imposes delay and expense on housing providers, and requires them to exercise psychological expertise outside the job description of most tenant selection personnel. Leaving aside these obvious burdens, the OGC Guidance had a chilling effect on housing providers’ duty to meet a fundamental obligation to other tenants – to promote their physical safety and assure them of the right of peaceful enjoyment of their premises.

By requiring plaintiffs to prove basic elements of a disparate impact claim – such as that the challenged practice is “arbitrary, artificial and unnecessary” – the Proposed Rule makes it far less likely that housing providers who make bona fide efforts, such as performing crime screening to protect their tenants, their staff and their properties, will face “abusive” disparate
impact claims. The Proposed Rule will help to strike the balance sought by the Inclusive Communities decision and properly focus on the “heartland” of disparate impact liability, as the Supreme Court intended.

B. **HUD Should Consider Additional Safe Harbors and Defenses To Disparate Impact Claims.**

In the Framework included in their 2018 Comments, the Housing Associations urged HUD to adopt additional safe harbors and defenses that would provide confidence to housing providers that reasonable property management practices would not subject them to disparate impact claims. The Housing Associations commend HUD for adopting several safe harbors and specific defenses for parties opposing disparate impact claims in the Proposed Rule. The Proposed Rule demonstrates that HUD made a serious effort to design safe harbors that protect legitimate decisions of government agencies and private firms, while preserving disparate impact liability in appropriate cases. Still, some additional modifications to the Proposed Rule would improve its equity and efficiency:

1. **Statistical Algorithms and Models.** Most notably, the Housing Associations applaud the proposal to permit public agencies and private firms to utilize mathematical algorithms to assess risk in appropriate cases. This is an extraordinarily helpful and prescient initiative. Statistical models are widely used in a variety of economic sectors to provide important insights into risk issues that experience and anecdotes simply cannot supply. Thanks to advances in information gathering and analysis, and developing technologies such as artificial intelligence, an enormous amount of information is available to assist government agencies and private firms to assess a variety of appropriate housing-related risks, such as credit, crime and casualty risks. The Proposed Rule recognizes that modeling risk issues is an essential task for agencies and businesses, that accurate risk assessments benefit everyone, and that agencies and businesses should be allowed to use the best available information and statistical modeling techniques to make accurate assessments of risk. HUD’s Proposed Rule recognizes the important principle that neutral facts, processed through a neutral model, produce a nondiscriminatory outcome. The possibility that some individuals, even a number of individuals, may be adversely effected by a particular outcome should not provide grounds to reject the validity or utility of information that modern algorithms generate. Indeed, in most instances, statistical modeling techniques will reduce bias in housing decisions – algorithms that are factually accurate and properly designed and used will minimize the possibility of bias (conscious or unconscious) that otherwise might improperly tilt risk decisions. While the Housing Associations have some recommendations for improving the Proposed Rule’s treatment of algorithms (see Section

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3 HUD should clarify that performing such “individualized assessments” of mitigating factors constitutes a “material burden” for purposes of proposed §100.500(d)(1)(ii) and (2)(iii), as discussed in more detail in Section C(1)(e), below. Indeed, HUD should take this opportunity to confirm that housing providers are never required to undertake such individualized assessments of mitigating factors to avoid disparate impact claims. See Section C(3) below.
C(2) below), they applaud HUD’s willingness to create a safe harbor for use of sophisticated risk assessment techniques.

2. **Safe Harbor for Compliance with Applicable Law.** The Proposed Rule also creates a safe harbor where a defendant shows that its discretion is materially limited by applicable law or by a binding judicial or administrative order or requirement. See Proposed Rule, §100.500(c)(1). This is similar to a proposed safe harbor included in the Housing Association’s Framework, where “the challenged policy or practice was required by, or reasonably calculated to comply with, an otherwise valid law or regulation of local, state or federal government.” 2018 Comments, Framework at 2. The Proposed Rule is narrower, however, because the protection provided by §100.500(c)(1) only applies where the housing provider’s “discretion is material limited” by some outside legal duty. A housing provider should know that it is also protected where it takes action that on its face is authorized by or intended to comply with applicable laws. This is not a speculative issue: In Burbank Tenants Assn. v. Kargman, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court concluded that an owner was still subject to a potential disparate impact claim, even though it had complied with all applicable HUD requirements for not renewing its Section 8 contract. 48 N.E.3d 394, 408-11 (Mass. 2016) (ultimately rejecting disparate impact claim because plaintiffs failed to satisfy Inclusive Communities’ “robust causality requirement”).

HUD therefore should clarify that housing providers who comply with otherwise valid Federal, state and local laws should not be subject to disparate impact claims, and should encourage them to take innovative action to meet their legal obligations, rather than narrowly restrict this safe harbor to those circumstances where the housing provider would have to provide its “discretion is materially limited” by outside legal issues. To do this, we recommend that proposed §100.500(c)(1) be revised as follows (new text in italics):

(1) The defendant shows that (x) the challenged policy or practice is authorized by or is reasonably calculated to comply with, or (y) its discretion is material limited by a third party such as through . . .

3. **Additional Safe Harbors and Defenses.** HUD should also consider adopting additional safe harbors and defenses that were discussed in the Framework attached to the Housing Associations’ 2018 Comments, including the following:

a. The challenged practice would be lawful if it is consistent with any policy or practice that HUD has approved for the operation of federally-insured housing as defined in 24 C.F.R. § 5.100.

b. The challenged policy or practice is related to determining tenant eligibility or selection, and is reasonably calculated to enhance housing opportunities for persons who are members of protected classes under the Act or state or local fair housing laws, members of the military or veterans, homeless persons, persons with AIDS/HIV, LGBTQ persons, or persons whose income is at or below the
maximum income allowed to qualify for Section 8 rental assistance or for a unit in
a low income housing tax credit or HUD-insured property.

c. A written policy or practice adopted prior to any challenge and made available to
prospective and current tenants that

i. Identifies a goal of the policy or practice that is not facially discriminatory
and that is beneficial to the defendant’s housing operations;

ii. Explains that the policy or practice is reasonably calculated to achieve the
goal; and

iii. Concludes that the policy or practice imposes no greater substantive
burden on members of a protected class than it imposes on the population
generally.

Again, the Housing Associations believe that the changes made by the Proposed Rule will allow
housing providers to adopt policies with confidence that they will not face subsequent disparate
impact scrutiny. The additional changes proposed here will provide further clarity and allow
housing providers even greater certainty that the policies they adopt will comply with the Act’s
requirements.

C. Recommendations for Additional Clarifications and Improvements.

While the Housing Associations commend HUD for making much-needed changes to the
Current Rule, HUD should consider some additional clarifications and improvements that would
make the Proposed Rule more efficient, such as the following:

1. **HUD should clarify key terms in the Proposed Rule.** While HUD properly adopted a
series of elements that a disparate impact claimant must prove, those elements contain
key words and phrases that have not been defined. In the absence of definitions, those
terms will have to be defined through litigation, a time-consuming and expensive
process that undermines the goals of uniformity and efficiency reflected in the Proposed
Rule. The Housing Associations urge HUD to provide additional definitions for the
following terms:

   a. **“Arbitrary, artificial and unnecessary”** (Proposed Rules, sec. 100.500 (b)(1)):
      This term is derived from the *Inclusive Communities* decision and prior Supreme
      Court decisions involving disparate impact claims. In *Inclusive Communities*, the
      Supreme Court described as “arbitrary” zoning policies that barred the
      construction of multifamily housing. See 135 S. Ct. at 2522. Similarly, it
      explained that the Act “aims to ensure that [legitimate] priorities can be achieved
      without arbitrarily creating discriminatory effects or perpetuating segregation.
      Id. (emphasis added). HUD should define the phrase “arbitrary, artificial and
      unnecessary” as applying to a policy that is not reasonably calculated to achieve
      a legitimate goal within the sound discretion of the policy-maker and that
imposes an otherwise unexplained burden on housing opportunities for persons in protected classes. It should also provide examples of policies that are arbitrary, artificial and unnecessary (such as zoning rules that artificially restrict the ability to develop multifamily housing) and those that are not, such as otherwise valid statistical models and algorithms that are used to make legitimate risk assessments (such as those discussed in proposed §100.500(c)(2)).

b. “Robust causal link” (Proposed Rule, §100.500(b)(2)): This phrase also derives from Inclusive Communities, which, among its proposed safeguards, called for a “[r]obust causality requirement.” Id. at 2523. As the Supreme Court warned, “a disparate impact claim that relies on statistical disparity must fail if it cannot point to a defendant’s policy or policies causing that disparity.” Id. at 2523 (emphasis added). Without such a causality requirement, government agencies and private firms would “almost inexorably” come to rely on improper racial quotas to avoid liability, which could raise “serious constitutional questions.” Id. Determining causation in housing related matters is challenging, among other reasons, “because of the multiple factors that go into investment decisions about where to construct or renovate housing units.” Id. at 2523-24. In other words, causation is not shown where a disparate impact is the effect of multiple causes, only one of which is the challenged practice. HUD should clarify the Proposed Rule to say that, to demonstrate a “robust causal link,” a claimant must show that the challenged practice is both the “direct and sole cause of the discriminatory effect.”

c. “Significant” disparity (Proposed Rule, §100.500(b)(4). The Proposed Rule would require a claimant to prove that “the alleged disparity caused by the policy or practice is significant,” but it doesn’t explain how “significance” should be measured. Indeed, one of the most persistent issues with disparate impact theory is determining how much of a disparity is sufficient to trigger liability. Because of the variety of ways in which a policy may affect housing opportunities, it is unlikely that a single numerical or percentage threshold for a “significant” impact can be established in advance. For example, what does it mean to say that an arbitrary zoning decision makes constructing a multifamily property twice as difficult as it would be without the rule? And even if it was possible to establish a threshold, what should the threshold be – is 5% more difficulty sufficient? Is 50% appropriate? Is 90% the right number? A strictly quantitative measure of significance is not likely to yield principled, consistent, and predictable results.

Instead of searching for a strict quantitative threshold, HUD should define a “significant” disparity in a functional way: A disparity is “significant” if it affects individual members of a protected class, in a qualitatively different manner than it affects individual members of the population at large. Suppose that a housing provider adopts a credit score requirement and that a higher percentage of minority applicants have substandard credit scores compared to nonminority applicants. If the evidence indicates that the housing provider rejects all
applicants, regardless of their minority/nonminority status, with the same substandard credit scores, the disparity would not be deemed to be significant. In other words, if the housing provider treats all persons with substandard credit scores similarly, regardless of their protected class status, the fact that more minorities may happen to be rejected would not constitute a “significant” disparity.

d. “Valid interest” (Proposed Rule, §§100.500(d)(1)(ii) and (2)(iii)): Under the Current Rule, if a disparate impact claimant establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate, as part of showing a “legally sufficient justification,” that “the challenged policy is necessary to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests of the respondent or defendant.” 24 CFR §100.500(c)(2). The Proposed Rule properly jettisons both the “legally sufficient justification” and “substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory” requirements. Both of these standards set multiple criteria that a defendant had to satisfy to support its policy, which opened the opportunity for litigation on multiple fronts. More important, these multifaceted standards made it extremely difficult for a well-intentioned housing provider to know whether – until it was forced to defend its policies in court – the policies satisfied the acid test set out in the Current Rule.

Instead, the Proposed Rule adopts the language from Inclusive Communities, explaining the burden that a disparate impact defendant must satisfy:

An important and appropriate means of ensuring that disparate-impact liability is properly limited is to give housing authorities and private developers leeway to state and explain the valid interest served by their policies.

135 S. Ct. at 2522 (noting incomplete analogies to “business necessity” test in employment discrimination cases) (emphasis added). In establishing that a housing owner only must show that the challenged policy satisfies a “valid interest,” HUD properly moves its disparate impact rule away from the burdensome standard in the Current Rule now and towards harmony with Inclusive Communities. To complete the process, HUD should make clear that to prove a “valid interest,” a housing provider is not required to demonstrate a “substantial, legitimate, nondiscrimination interest” in the challenged policy and instead is only required to show that the challenged policy (1) is reasonably calculated to achieve a generally recognized property management goal (including profitable operation of the property) and (2) does not on its face discriminate against a protected class.

e. “Materially greater costs” and “material burden” (Proposed Rule, §§100.500(d)(1)(ii) and (2)(iii)): The Proposed Rule significantly overhauls the provisions in the Current Rule that, after the defendant meets the “substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interest” test, shifts the burden back to the plaintiff.
to show a “less discriminatory” alternative. §100.500(c)(3). The error in the Current Rule was brought into stark relief in *MHANY Mgmt. v. Cty. of Nassau, No. 05-cv-2301, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153214 at *20-26* (E.D.N.Y Sept. 19, 2017), where the district court concluded that a plaintiff satisfied this standard by demonstrating that a less discriminatory “alternative” existed, even though that “alternative” was not “equally effective” as the challenged policy. Wisely, the Proposed Rule makes clear that a less discriminatory alternative must be “equally effective” as the challenged policy, eliminating the possibility that a housing provider may be compelled to adopt policies that do not meet their reasonable operation and management needs.

More important, the Proposed Rule requires that a less discriminatory alternative must not “impos[e] materially greater costs on, or creat[e] other material burdens for, the defendant.” To avoid uncertainty and unnecessary litigation in the future, HUD should clarify what “materiality” means in these contexts. Specifically, HUD should clarify that a cost increase or a burden is “material” if it imposes a cost or burden that, but for the disparate impact claim, would not be incurred by a housing provider. For example, as discussed in more detail below, it would be a “material burden” to require a housing provider, who has already performed an individualized credit or crime screening analysis, to undertake an additional “individualized assessment” of possible mitigating factors before disqualifying a substandard applicant. In such a case, the owner clearly has a “valid interest” to assess credit- and crime-related risks before entering into a lease with an applicant. To the extent that the owner has obtained reliable information about a specific applicant that indicates the applicant poses a substandard risk, and uses the information as intended, no additional individualized assessment should be required. Any such individualized assessment should be deemed to pose a “material burden” on the housing provider, because it reflects a cost that, but for a threat of disparate impact liability, it would not have to incur. HUD should make clear that any such costs are “material burdens” that an owner should not be required to prove.

2. **HUD should provide additional clarification about the use of algorithms and mathematical models.** As noted above, statistical algorithms and models can benefit everyone by allowing accurate assessment of risks encountered in the housing sector. There are some provisions of the Proposed Rule, however, that need to be clarified so

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4 Arguably, to the extent that the “equally effective manner,” “materially greater costs,” and “material burden” provisions of proposed §100.500(d)(2) impose burdens on the defendant, they go beyond what *Inclusive Communities* allows. In that case, the Supreme Court indicated that the only burden imposed on the defendant in a disparate impact case is to show a “valid interest.” 135 S. Ct. at 2522, 2523. To the extent that §100.500(d)(2) suggests that the defendant also has a duty to show that a less discriminatory alternative is “equally effective,” that it imposes no “materially greater costs,” or that it raises no “material burden” on the defendant, it violates the *Inclusive Communities* holding. HUD should make clear that at all times, the burden is solely on the plaintiff to show a less discriminatory alternative exists, including proving that the alleged alternative is equally effective and imposes no material costs or burdens on the defendant. The defendant always has the ability to *rebut* any such showing, but it should not bear the burden of *proving* them itself.
that the full benefit of risk modeling is available to government agencies and private firms alike.

For example, proposed § 100.500(c)(2)(i) allows a defendant to rebut a disparate impact claim based on use of an algorithm, if it can show that the factors used in the model “do not rely in any material part on factors that are substitutes or close proxies for protected classes under the Fair Housing Act . . . .” The term “substitutes or close proxies for protected classes” is not defined and ultimately begs the question – if a factor is not somehow closely correlated with a protected class, how can it raise a disparate impact question in the first place? The question should never be whether there is a correlation between a statistical factor used in a model and a protected class. Rather, the question should be whether there is a statistically valid reason to use a specific factor in order to assess the specific risk involved. If there is, and if there happens to be a coincidence between that factor and members of a protected class, then the only question should be whether adverse decisions based on the statistical model somehow are applied differently to persons in the protected class than they are applied to persons who are not in that protected class. As noted above, if a model yields the same negative credit scores for two individuals, one in a protected class and one who is not, and both are rejected, it is hard to see how there is a disparate impact on the person in the protected class.5

Similarly, proposed section 100.500(c)(2)(ii) – which provides a defense for models “produced, maintained, or distributed by a recognized third party that determines industry standards” – should also be clarified. There are a large number of entities in the housing sector – including the Housing Associations themselves – that make important contributions to policy and operational issues. Indeed, one of the remarkable aspects of the housing industry is the diversity of perspectives that are reflected in housing policy in this country. Given this wide variety of perspectives, it is not clear which of these organizations, if any, would qualify as “a recognized third party that determines industry standards.” HUD is wise to try to provide a defense for neutral algorithmic models that are widely used in the housing industry, but it needs to provide additional guidance to explain when such models should be allowed. If HUD chooses to retain language that looks at the reputation of the producer of the model, it need to provide additional information to explain how that status is determined. Instead, HUD may want to focus less on the industry reputation or leadership of the third party that produces the model, and more on the acceptance of the model itself across the industry (which could be demonstrated by the number of firms that use the model).

3. **HUD should clarify that having made a fact-based individualized decision on the basis of neutral criteria, a housing provider is not require to perform any further “individualized assessment.”** Because it is in the process of overhauling its disparate impact regulations generally, HUD should take this opportunity to limit the scope of

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5 And of course, if the two individuals receive the same negative score, but the person in the protected class is rejected while the person not in the protected class is admitted, it is hard to see how that should be treated as a case of disparate impact instead of a case of intentional disparate treatment, subject to the rules applicable to such cases.
“individualized assessments,” such as consideration of mitigating information, in the context of disparate impact claims. Although, as explained below, the concept emerged in the context of other fair housing issues, individualized assessments have crept into disparate impact cases and guidance as a sort of uncodified element of the defendant’s proof. That is, in addition to showing that it has a “valid interest” in a specific policy or practice, a housing provider must also show that before that policy is applied adversely against a member of a protected class, the provider has considered other possibly mitigating information about that individual. Nothing in disparate impact theory itself—and certainly nothing in Inclusive Communities—requires housing providers to bear an additional duty to consider individual mitigating information, at least where they have obtained reliable adverse individual information in the first place, such as a substandard credit score or crime screening report.

As noted earlier, the 2016 OGC Guidance on crime screening demonstrates how individualized assessments distort the process established by the Current Rule. According to the OGC Guidance, before rejecting a prospective renter based on adverse criminal history, a housing provider must consider other mitigating factors, such as the specific facts and circumstances of the subject criminal activity, the age of the renter at the time the criminal conduct occurred, and subsequent rehabilitation activities. See OGC Guidance at 7. Leaving aside the fact that some of this information may not be available to a housing provider under any circumstances, it is clear that acquiring this information will impose additional costs on a housing provider that it would not otherwise incur. Moreover, such an individualized assessment inevitably imposes delays which could result in loss of other prospective renters who decide to look elsewhere for housing. Further, even assuming all of the information required by HUD was obtainable, a meaningful “assessment” of this information requires a degree of psychological insight that most property management professionals do not possess. Finally, the OGC Guidance discusses individualized assessments in the context of demonstrating that a less discriminatory alternative exists. See OGC Guidance at 7. But even under the Current Rule, that burden belongs to the plaintiff, not the defendant. See §100.500(c)(3). HUD has never explained how under the OGC Guidance, a plaintiff’s duty to demonstrate a less discriminatory alternative somehow metamorphoses into an additional element for the defendant to prove. HUD should make clear that individualized assessments of mitigating information are never part of the housing provider’s burden under either the Current Rule or the Proposed Rule.6

6 Outside of the disparate impact context, an “individualized assessment” requirement has also been imposed where, for example, a housing provider bases a decision to disqualify an applicant, evict a tenant, or take other adverse action on the basis of non-personalized stereotypes, such as situations invoking the so-called “direct threat” exception to a housing provider’s duty to make reasonable accommodations. See 24 CFR §100.202(d) (establishing “direct threat” exception); see also Boston Housing Authority v. Bridgeworkers, 898 N.E.2d 848, 855 (Mass. 2009) (a landlord could not utilize the “direct threat” exception to evict a tenant because of a diagnosis of Tourette disorder, even where the tenant had exhibited violence towards other tenants; before eviction, landlord was required to perform an individualized assessment to determine whether the individual’s behavior could be stabilized by a reasonable accommodation); see also FHEO Notice-2013-01 at 4 (breed-specific bans on assistance animals not allowed; “determining that an assistance animal poses a
As a result of establishing specific elements of disparate impact claims and squarely placing the burden on the claimant to prove those elements, HUD moved aggressively to bring its disparate impact regulation into harmony with the rules announced by the Supreme Court in its Inclusive Communities decision. With the modifications and clarifications discussed elsewhere in these comments, the Proposed Rule should be adopted by HUD.

D. Responses to HUD's specific requests for comments

In addition to seeking comments on the Proposed Rule itself, the Proposal identified a number of additional matters for which HUD sought public input. See 884 Fed. Reg. at 42860-61. While several of those questions are addressed in the course of the preceding comments, the Housing Associations provide the follow responses to the questions posed in the body of the Proposal by HUD.

a) First, HUD asked whether, and under what circumstances, punitive or exemplary damages may be appropriate in disparate impact litigation in Federal court. 84 Fed. Reg. at 42857. The Housing Associations respond that punitive and exemplary damages should never be awarded in disparate impact cases because by definition, disparate impact claims involve unintentional acts. Defendants should not face punitive/exemplary damages in the absence of evidence of actual discriminatory intent.

b) HUD also asked for comments “regarding any less burdensome alternatives to this rule that will meet HUD’s objectives as described in the preamble to this rule.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 42861, The Housing Associations respond that the only alternative to the Proposed Rule – completely eliminating its disparate impact regulation – would not reduce burdens. A uniform, national disparate impact rule that correctly reflects the safeguards identified in the Inclusive Communities decision is preferable to allowing courts and other decision-makers to resolve remaining issues on a case-by-case basis, which is likely to result in balkanization of disparate impact jurisprudence.

c) HUD also requested comments on the potential burden or benefit the proposed regulations may have on potential claimants and the organizations that represent them, some of which are small businesses. Id. The Housing Associations respond that subject to the recommendations contained in these comments, the Proposed Rule strikes a reasonable balance between competing interests and helps to bring HUD’s disparate impact rules into harmony with the Inclusive Communities holding.

direct threat . . . must be based on an individualized assessment . . . about the specific animal’s actual conduct – not on mere speculation or fear” about the harm an animal may cause or that other animals have caused. In these cases, an “individualized assessment” is used to confirm that the housing provider is basing its decision on concrete information, rather than stereotypes and unsubstantiated fears. Those are different situations from cases where, for example, an owner has done its due diligence and confirmed that verified credit or criminal history information relating to a specific individual raises a bona fide risk concerning that individual. In such cases, where the housing provider has demonstrated its “valid interest” and based its decision on individualized information, no further “individualized assessment” should be required.
d) HUD also asked about the nature, propriety, and use of algorithmic models as related to the defenses in proposed §100.500(c)(2). Id. at 42860. The Housing Associations endorse the use of algorithms as risk assessment tools and commend HUD for creating a defense to disparate impact claims based on them. See Section C(2), above.

In addition to these requests, Section III of the Proposal includes requests for comments on a variety of questions. Id. at 42860. The Housing Associations provide the following responses to those questions:

1. How well do HUD’s proposed changes to its disparate impact standard align with the decision and analysis in Inclusive Communities with respect to the proposed prima facie burden, including:

   i. Each of the five elements in the new burden-shifting framework outlined in paragraph (b) of § 100.500.

   ii. The three methods described in paragraph (c) of § 100.500 through which defendants may establish that plaintiffs have failed to allege a prima facie case.

   **Response 1:** As explained above, the Proposed Rule aligns closely with the Inclusive Communities decision. We believe that the specific elements included in proposed §100.500(b) are urgently needed to clarify what a disparate impact claimant must prove to validate its claim and are essential to assure that HUD’s disparate impact rule harmonizes with what Inclusive Communities requires. Likewise, the defenses and safe harbors reflected in proposed §100.500(c) are consistent with both the elements of a disparate impact claim identified in Inclusive Communities and the steps housing providers can take to show that the disparate impact claimant has not established those elements. Elsewhere in these comments, we suggest relatively minor changes and clarification what would bring the Proposed Rule into even closer harmony with Inclusive Communities.

2. What impact, using specific court cases as reference, did Inclusive Communities have on the number, type, and likelihood of success of disparate impact claims brought since the 2015 decision? How might this proposed rule further impact the number, type, and likelihood of success of disparate impact claims brought in the future?

   **Response 2:** While mindful of HUD’s disparate impact rules, courts necessarily have treated Inclusive Communities as the most authoritative guidance on disparate impact liability under the Act. Courts have heeded the “safeguards” included identified in Inclusive Communities, and seem to be distinguishing those cases in the “heartland” of disparate impact, such as exclusionary zoning practices (see MHANY Mgmt. v. Cty. of Nassau, above), from cases dealing with exercises of reasonable business decisions. See, e.g., Burbank Tenant Assn., above (Mass. 2016)(holding that plaintiffs had failed to satisfy “robust causality requirement” of Inclusive Communities, where evidence did not indicate plaintiffs would actually suffer as a result of non-renewal of Section 8 lease).
Yet even in these cases—and in many others—courts have struggled with applying the safeguards identified in *Inclusive Communities* in a systematic manner. In some cases, the courts seem to cherry-pick some concepts from that case while ignoring others, to reach the outcome they want. One advantage to the Proposed Rule is that it attempts to codify the safeguards identified in *Inclusive Communities* into a set of elements that a disparate impact claimant must prove. This will encourage courts, other decision-makers, and litigants to address each element of a disparate impact claim thoroughly and consistently.

3. *How, specifically, did Inclusive Communities, and the cases brought since Inclusive Communities, expand upon, conflict, or align with HUD’s 2013 final disparate impact rule and with this proposed rule?*

**Response 3:** The Current Rule attempted to establish a simplified framework for addressing disparate impact claims. Unfortunately, by minimizing issues such as causation and other safeguards, the Current Rule encouraged expansive applications of disparate impact unhinged from the “heartland” of disparate impact cases that, as the OGC Guidance demonstrated, undermined legitimate policy decisions by public and private entities and threatened “abusive” disparate impact claims. The clearest example of how the Current Rule required correction is the handling of the claims in the *Inclusive Communities* litigation, before and after the Supreme Court’s decision. In its decision, rendered between the decision of the district court and the Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit expressly adopted the Current Rule to affirm the district court’s decision that the state agency’s tax credit allocation policies had a disparate impact on minorities in violation of the Act. *Inclusive Cmts. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cnty. Affairs*, 747 F.3d 275, 282 (5th. Cir. 2014). After the Supreme Court’s decision, the district court on remand reversed its original decision and found that there was no disparate impact-based liability, specifically finding that the plaintiffs had not established the “robust causality requirement” identified in *Inclusive Communities*. *Inclusive Cmts. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cnty. Affairs*, No. 3:08-CV-0546-D, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114562 at *41 (N.D. Tex. 2016 Aug. 26, 2016). By incorporating the safeguards identified by the Supreme Court’s decision in *Inclusive Communities*—subject to the improvements and clarification discussed elsewhere in these comments—the Proposed Rule will eliminate the errors in the Current Rule and direct future disparate impact cases towards the “heartland” the Supreme Court directed.

Since the *Inclusive Communities* decision, at least some courts have attempted to create their own set of disparate impact elements based on the principles discussed in that case. See, e.g., *City of Miami v. Bank of Am. Corp.*, 171 F. Supp. 3d 1314, 1319 (S.D. Fla. 2016) (adopting four-prong disparate impact standard); *Cobb Cty. v. Bank of Am. Corp.*, 183 F. Supp. 3d 1332, 1346 (N.D. Ga. 2016) (adopting most of *City of Miami* four-part standard). In both cases, the courts dismissed the disparate impact claims for failing to meet one or more of the prongs they established, including failing to show that challenged policy was “arbitrary, artificial and unnecessary” and
failing to meet a “robust” or “substantial” causality requirement. Perhaps the most significant aspect of these cases is that the courts created their own disparate impact tests, completely ignoring the Current Rule to adjudicate the plaintiffs’ claims. That suggests that the courts recognized that the Current Rule does not reflect the safeguards identified in the Inclusive Communities decision. The cases also serve as a warning that unless HUD revises the Current Rule, courts will continue to experiment with different disparate impact standards derived from the Inclusive Communities decision, resulting in the same sort of balkanized rules that prevailed before the Current Rule was put in place. Adopting the Proposed Rule, with the modifications suggested here, will discourage further improvisation by courts and encourage the development of uniform national standards and outcomes in disparate impact cases, which were two of the principle goals in issuing a disparate impact regulation in the first place.

4. How might the proposed rule increase or decrease costs and economic burden to relevant parties (e.g., litigants, including private citizens, local governments, banks, lenders, insurance companies, or others in the housing industry) relative to the 2013 final disparate impact rule? How might the proposed rule increase or decrease costs and economic burden to relevant parties relative to Inclusive Communities?

Response No. 4: Neither the Inclusive Communities decision or the Proposed Rule should be seen as placing a thumb on the scales of justice. The issue is not whether the Inclusive Communities decision or the Proposed Rule promote or restrict the likelihood of success of disparate impact claims. Rather, the question should be whether the Proposed Rule captures the spirit of the Inclusive Communities decision, which vindicated the use of disparate impact liability in fair housing cases, but identified a number of safeguards to prevent “abusive” disparate impact cases. In this respect, both the Inclusive Communities decision and the Proposed Rule strike a reasonable balance between enforcing fair housing rights without improperly “second-guessing” otherwise legitimate decisions by public and private entities.

5. How might a decision not to amend HUD’s 2013 final disparate impact rule affect the status quo since Inclusive Communities?

Response No. 5: As discussed above, since the Inclusive Communities decision, the proper scope of disparate impact liability has remained in controversy. As the OGC Guidance on crime screening demonstrates, the failure to incorporate the safeguards identified by the Supreme Court leaves open the possibility of imposing liability on housing providers for pursuing policies that are reasonable efforts to achieve neutral and otherwise legitimate goals (in the case of crime screening, promoting the safety and security of housing). In general, courts have focused on whether the challenged practice imposes an “arbitrary, artificial and unnecessary” barrier to housing opportunities, and whether the plaintiff has demonstrated “robust causation” between the challenged policy and the alleged discriminatory impacts. Often, however, the courts and other decision-makers have struggled to work through the other
safeguards, sometimes giving emphasis to one safeguard or another, without approaching them as elements of a disparate impact claim in a systematic manner. If HUD chooses not to amend its disparate impact rule, courts and other decision-makers will not have the advantage of a framework to consider each of the elements of a disparate impact claim (and the applicable defenses) in an orderly and thorough manner that the Proposed Rule offers. As noted in Response 3 above, if the Current Rule is not revised, courts may decide that it does not accurately reflect the holding of the Supreme Court's Inclusive Communities decision, and will devise case-by-case solutions, which are likely to lead to increasingly divergent outcomes and frustrate the goals of uniformity and predictability that the Proposed Rule promotes.

6. What impact, if any, does the addition of paragraph (e) of § 100.500 regarding the business of insurance have on the number and type of disparate impact claims? What impact, if any, does the proposed paragraph (e) have on costs (or savings) and economic burden of disparate impact claims?

Response No. 6: While we assume insurance interests are in the best position to comment on this question, the Housing Associations note that HUD’s policies with respect to disparate impact should be focused primarily on whether or not they conform with the Inclusive Communities decision and other leading precedents.

7. Is there any other data, information, or analysis the public can provide to assist HUD in assessing the impact of the proposed regulation relative to the 2013 disparate impact final rule and the 2015 Supreme Court decision in Inclusive Communities?

Response No. 7: We commend HUD for creating a defense for use of neutral algorithmic models that can be used to assess risks in a nondiscriminatory manner. See Section C(2), above. At the moment, HUD has not identified the criteria that can be used to confirm whether particular models can be relied upon to produce nondiscriminatory risk assessments. HUD should undertake additional analysis of models used in the housing industry to confirm whether these models yield useful, nondiscriminatory risk assessments or at a minimum attempt to establish neutral criteria the housing providers and third parties that develop such models can use to assess whether they meet the safe harbor requirements in advance.
Conclusion

The Housing Associations commend HUD for taking bold action to overhaul its Current Rule and to offer a Proposed Rule that reflects key aspects of the Inclusive Communities decision and the 2018 Comments. While they offer some additional suggestions for clarifications and improvements, the Housing Associations believe the Proposed Rule is properly focused on eliminating the defects in the Current Rule, incorporating the guidance provided by the Inclusive Communities decision, and crafting a uniform, national disparate impact rule that strikes a proper balance between the interests of all parties concerned.

Very truly yours,

[Signature]

Harry J. Kelly